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Cohort change, diffusion, and support for  




Arguments about the spread of gender egalitarian values through a population highlight 
several sources of change. First, structural arguments point to increases in the 
proportion of women with high education, jobs with good pay, commitment to careers 
outside the family, and direct interests in gender equality. Second, value-shift 
arguments contend that gender norms change with economic affluence among women 
and men in diverse positions—at all levels of education, for example. Third, diffusion 
arguments suggest that structural changes lead to adoption of new ideas and values 
supportive of gender equality by innovative, high-education groups, but that the new 
ideas later diffuse to other groups. This study tests these arguments by using 
International Social Survey Program surveys in 1988, 1994, and 2002 for 19 nations to 
examine gender egalitarianism across 85 cohorts born from roughly 1900 to 1984. 
Multilevel models support diffusion arguments by demonstrating that the effects of 
education first strengthen with early adoption of gender egalitarianism and then weaken 
as other groups come to accept the same views. However, the evidence of a sequence of 
divergence and convergence in educational differences across cohorts appears most 
clearly for women in Western nations. 
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1. Introduction 
Under the broad term of the second demographic transition, demographers have 
described the wide-ranging changes that have occurred in living arrangements, gender 
roles, and childbearing (e.g., Lesthaeghe 2010). The changes encompass not only new 
behaviors involving sexual freedom, declining fertility, childbearing outside of 
marriage, and a greater variety of family forms (cohabitation, divorce, blended families, 
living alone) but also underlying value changes of individual autonomy, social equality, 
and tolerance of diversity (Lesthaeghe and Surkyn 1988). Central to the second 
demographic transition and to the broader liberalization of values are new roles for 
women and more favorable values, attitudes, and beliefs toward gender equality (or 
gender egalitarianism for short). The progress made over past decades toward the goal 
of widespread support for gender equality (Fischer and Hout 2006; Jackson 1998; 
Thornton and Young-DeMarco 2001) has affected most demographic processes, 
including fertility (Goldscheider, Oláh, and Puur 2010; Rindfuss, Brewster, and Kavee 
1996), childlessness (Henz 2008), combining work and family responsibilities (Oláh 
and Bernhardt 2008), job segregation (Charles and Bradley 2002), and family 
relationships (Amato and Booth 1995; Kaufman 2000).  
Demographers have also noted that a good part of the change in gender 
egalitarianism involves processes of cohort differentiation and replacement. The cohort 
approach to societal change follows a long tradition (Ryder 1965) in emphasizing the 
importance of the economic and ideational context at the time of a cohort’s youth. 
Relatively stable values, attitudes, and beliefs that develop during youth and young 
adulthood endure over the later life course, and change comes from replacement of 
older cohorts raised decades ago with younger cohorts raised more recently. Numerous 
studies have demonstrated that differences in gender egalitarianism stem in large part 
from cohort membership (Brooks and Bolzendahl 2004; Firebaugh 1992; Inglehart and 
Norris 2003; Schnittker, Freese, and Powell 2003; Scott, Alwin, and Braun 1996).   
In a recent article, Pampel (2011) evaluated several cohort-based explanations of 
increasing gender egalitarianism. Using data from the General Social Surveys of the 
United States and focusing on differences across cohorts born from 1900 to 1985, 
support was found for a diffusion theory that predicts changes in the socioeconomic 
distribution as well as the level of gender egalitarianism. More limited support was 
found for competing theories that emphasize the importance of either structural change 
in levels of female education and labor force participation or broad cultural changes in 
values affecting all education and labor force groups. The findings build on 
demographic approaches to social change that emphasize cohort influences, but also, in 
focusing on diffusion, offer a more precise description of how cohort change occurs.   Demographic Research: Volume 25, Article 21 
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The examination of cohort changes in one nation can offer only modest support for 
the diffusion arguments, however. European nations show diversity in attitudes toward 
gender equality (Alwin, Braun, and Scott 1992), with Norway, Sweden, and the 
Netherlands having stronger support for working mothers than nations of central, 
southern, and eastern Europe (Treas and Widmer 2000). The goal of this study is to 
extend tests of theories of cohort change in gender egalitarianism to include European 
nations and thereby offer a more complete evaluation of the theories as well as their 
international scope. The next sections describe the competing explanations of changing 
gender egalitarianism as presented by Pampel (2011) and then present new tests using 
comparative data for 19 European or European-heritage nations from the International 
Social Survey Program.  
 
 
2. Structural influences 
Changes in gender egalitarianism may occur through increases in the proportion of 
women with high education, good-paying jobs, and commitment to careers outside the 
family. As jobs shift from industrial economies to post-industrial service and 
knowledge economies and the demand of employers for female workers rises (Huber 
1990), the labor force becomes more gender integrated. Tertiary educational 
opportunities for women increase, as does access to professional and managerial jobs 
once filled by men. Trends toward later marriage, fewer children, and more divorce 
reinforce education and job changes (Brooks and Bolzendahl 2004). At the societal 
level, then, the composition of the population changes in ways that foster gender 
egalitarianism. 
An interest-based mechanism underlies arguments about the economic stake that 
nontraditional women have in gender equality (Bolzendahl and Myers 2004; Huber and 
Spitze 1981; Plutzer 1988). Because women with high education and special job skills 
gain the most from equal treatment and suffer the most from gender discrimination, 
they tend to have more egalitarian attitudes. To a lesser extent, men may also benefit 
economically from more egalitarian treatment and higher pay for working spouses, 
children, and relatives (Smith 1985; Zuo and Tang 2000). Indeed, studies have found 
that men have more egalitarian attitudes when they are part of a dual-earning couple 
(Cha and Thébaud 2009). In contrast, women with more traditional commitments to 
family and children will have fewer incentives to adopt new attitudes (Glass 1992; 
Kane and Sanchez 1994). They may even strengthen their adherence to traditional 
attitudes, which widens gender-based political cleavages (Plutzer 1988). Despite 
structural change, then, the continued dependence of some women on men maintains Pampel: Cohort change, diffusion, and support for gender egalitarianism in cross-national perspective 
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inegalitarian views (Baxter and Kane 1995). Also, men’s interests may partly lie in 
gender inequality that reinforces their advantages in job opportunities and income. 
Much of the change in gender egalitarianism related to structural position occurs 
through cohort replacement (Brewster and Padavic 2000; Brooks and Bolzendahl 2004; 
Firebaugh 1992). New educational, work, and job opportunities for women—and new 
values, attitudes, and beliefs—emerge among younger generations. The positions and 
roles of older cohorts change less, as do their more traditional attitudes. The 
replacement of older cohorts by younger cohorts who are more affected by recent 
structural changes in education and work leads to greater prevalence of gender 
egalitarianism. If those with socioeconomic characteristics, such as high education, that 
predispose them toward egalitarian views become a steadily larger part of the 
population, particularly among younger generations, then the level of gender 
egalitarianism will rise as well, even as inegalitarian values persist among older cohorts. 
 
 
3. Value shifts 
Arguments focusing on broad shifts in values suggest that gender norms develop, at 
least in part, independently of social structural position. Women and men in varied 
positions of a society—those with and without advanced education, for example—come 
to adopt more egalitarian attitudes with material prosperity. Broad changes in values do 
not erase attitudinal differences, but they raise egalitarianism similarly across diverse 
social positions and groups. Thus, studies have found a pervasive trend toward 
endorsement of gender equality in the United States since the 1960s (Rindfuss, 
Brewster, and Kavee 1996; Thorton and Young-DeMarco 2001). Support for gender 
equality grew among men as well as women (Bolzendahl and Myers 2004), and among 
active Protestants with conservative religious views as well as less religious and liberal 
groups (Petersen and Donnenwerth 1998). 
The pervasive value shift raises questions about why groups in different positions 
and with different interests similarly become more egalitarian. Inglehart and Norris 
(2003) argued that economic prosperity and material security foster a broad cultural 
shift toward postmaterialist, quality-of-life values that emphasize equality, self-
expression, and individualism (also see Inglehart and Baker 2000). Jackson (1998) 
argued that the shift of economic and political power from households to business and 
government institutions in modern societies tends to erode family authority, communal 
obligations, and traditional beliefs and to weaken the incentives and means needed to 
maintain men’s power over women. Given the pervasiveness of the change, diverse 
social groups tend to respond with stronger support for gender equality.  Demographic Research: Volume 25, Article 21 
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These arguments treat interests in broad terms (Inglehart 1989). Despite the 
existence of inequality, societal economic prosperity and material security tend to affect 
norms and values widely. Interests thus remain a key source of egalitarian values but 
relate to the larger social and economic context of value change rather than to the 
particular positions of individuals. However, these egalitarian values tend to change 
generationally. Adoption of new values commonly occurs during adolescence and 
young adulthood, and cohorts tend to retain these values throughout later adulthood.  
Inglehart (1989) argued that cohorts raised during the post–World War II decades of 
material prosperity and economic security widely adopted postmaterialist values. In 
support, Inglehart and Norris (2003:46) found that generation more strongly predicts 
egalitarian attitudes than does sex, class, or education. 
The value-shift arguments thus differ fundamentally from structural arguments in 
accounting for rising gender egalitarianism. They posit that, at least among post–World 
War II cohorts, egalitarian attitudes increase across diverse sociodemographic groups. 
While women in nontraditional positions maintain more egalitarian views than others, 
changes in gender egalitarianism occur widely in postindustrial societies.  
 
 
4. Patterns of diffusion 
Diffusion arguments highlight a sequence of influences in which the early stages of 
change mostly involve the attitudes of educated and working women, those in 
nontraditional positions and with the strongest interests in gender equality. At later 
stages of change, egalitarianism diffuses vertically from high status, nontraditional 
innovators to lower status, less innovative, and more traditional groups (Poole and 
Zeigler 1981). Thus, effects of the determinants first strengthen as innovative groups 
with strong interests in gender equality adopt egalitarian views and set themselves apart 
from other groups. The effects of the determinants then weaken as gender egalitarian 
views diffuse to larger parts of the population (Fischer and Hout 2006).  
In support, several studies describe a process of catching up in which formerly 
wide attitude differences narrow with the spread of new values to less innovative 
groups. Mason and Lu (1988) found growth in gender egalitarianism among most 
sociodemographic groups in the United States from 1977 to 1985, except for college-
educated women, who already had high gender egalitarianism. Bolzendahl and Myers 
(2004) found that as most people come to accept gender egalitarian goals, individual 
determinants of attitudes toward women’s participation in the public sphere have 
declining influence. Fischer and Hout (2006) found widening and narrowing by age and 
city residence in measures of approval for working women from 1936 to 2000.  Pampel: Cohort change, diffusion, and support for gender egalitarianism in cross-national perspective 
   http://www.demographic-research.org  672
These changes in relationships are consistent with general diffusion arguments. 
Montgomery and Casterline (1993) defined diffusion as the influence of adoption of 
innovative ideas and behaviors by some individuals on the likelihood of adoption by 
others. Diffusion often first occurs horizontally among higher socioeconomic groups 
because these groups tend to be the most innovative and have communication networks 
across structurally equivalent positions (Strang and Meyer 1993). Advanced education, 
for example, fosters gender egalitarianism at the early stage of the epidemic by 
promoting tolerance (Weil 1985), openness to new ideas (Rogers 2003), and cognitive 
skills needed to better evaluate new ideas (Ohlander, Batalova, and Treas 2005). 
Vertical diffusion often follows, as lower ranking groups adopt the practices and ideas 
of more prestigious groups (Fischer 1978; Strang and Soule 1998). Interests or the 
relative advantage of adoption play a role in adoption of innovations, at least initially 
(Rogers 2003:229). Later, acceptance of new ideas may become self-sustaining after 
adopters reach a critical mass (Rogers 2003:343). At that point, adoption by less 
innovative groups requires less risk and boldness.   
The arguments predict that the early adoption of gender egalitarianism by more 
advantaged groups initially involves innovation that strengthens socioeconomic 
differences, but the vertical diffusion of the values to other groups later reduces 
socioeconomic differences. However, women who benefit the most from gender 
equality will more quickly adopt new attitudes than men (Ciabattari 2001). The 
diffusion of gender egalitarianism may occur for men but not as quickly or to the same 




The hypotheses focus neither on overall changes in support for gender egalitarianism 
nor on group differences in attitudes—topics that have been well studied. Rather, they 
focus on the combination of the two topics: on whether groups change their attitudes at 
different rates and exhibit divergence in views followed by convergence. Further, the 
hypotheses focus on cohort differences in gender egalitarianism. As noted earlier, 
cohort replacement is a crucial component of change in gender egalitarianism; the 
precise pattern of cohort change is less well understood, and each hypothesis posits a 
different mechanism of cohort differentiation.   
In differentiating between the theoretical arguments, the hypotheses focus largely 
on education. Although other sociodemographic characteristics, such as employment, 
income, and family status, strongly influence gender egalitarianism, education has 
special value in making comparisons across cohorts. Because education is determined 
early in life, it relates directly to the past experiences of cohorts. Education measured at Demographic Research: Volume 25, Article 21 
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age 75 for older cohorts likely differs little from education if it were measured 50 years 
earlier at age 25. In contrast, current employment, income, and family status of a cohort 
will differ enormously from their levels decades ago. Given that older cohorts lack data 
on other indicators for earlier ages and periods, the stability of education over the later 
life course makes it most suited for specifying and testing the hypotheses. Of course, 
education also has value because it relates closely to other components of 
socioeconomic background and attainment. With this in mind, the competing 
hypotheses are as follows: 
H1: Changes in the educational composition of cohorts account for cohort 
increases in gender egalitarianism. Consistent with structural arguments, the hypothesis 
implies that differences in gender egalitarianism across groups with varied levels of 
education (and indirectly with varied work and income opportunities that follow from 
education) are maintained across cohorts, but that low-education groups decline in size 
relative to groups with high education.  
H2: Changes across cohorts in gender egalitarianism occur similarly for 
educational groups. Consistent with value-shift arguments, the hypothesis implies that 
differences in views across innovative groups with high education and more traditional 
groups with low education persist but that gender egalitarianism rises across cohorts for 
all educational groups. 
H3: Changes across cohorts first affect innovative groups with high education, thus 
strengthening the effects of education on gender egalitarianism and creating divergence 
in views, but the changes later affect less-educated groups, thus weakening the 
differentiating effects of education and creating convergence in views. Consistent with 
diffusion arguments, the hypothesis also implies that the changes occur more quickly 
and strongly for women than men.  
Previous studies have analyzed consecutive cross-sectional surveys in the United 
States (Bolzendahl and Myers 2004; Brewster and Padavic 2000; Carter, Corra, and 
Carter 2009; Mason and Lu 1988; Rindfuss, Brewster, and Kavee 1996; Spitze and 
Huber 1980), and several examine the influence of cohort on attitudes (Brooks and 
Bolzendahl 2004; Schnittker, Freese, and Powell 2003; Wilkie 1993). Several others 
have examined attitudinal differences across nations (Scott, Alwin, and Braun 1996; 
Treas and Widmer 2000). Besides the work of Pampel (2011), however, no study has 
fully tested the predictions about nonlinear strengthening and weakening across cohorts 
of the effects of education.  
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6. Methods 
6.1 Data 
The International Social Survey Program (ISSP 2011), a collaboration of nations 
conducting annual surveys for probability samples of their populations, has completed 
three sets of surveys on gender roles. Eight nations participated in the 1988 surveys; 24 
in the 1994 surveys; and 35 in the 2002 surveys. To examine cohort effects, however,   
only nations with data for at least two of the years are used.
2 Counting separate surveys 
for East and West Germany and for Great Britain and Northern Ireland, that leaves 22 
nations or national regions. However, all but three nations are European in location or 
heritage.  The exceptions—Israel, Japan, and the Philippines—differ enough from the 
others in geographic location, history, and culture to exclude from the analysis.  Of the 
remaining 19 nations, seven have surveys for all three years. Because of the longer time 
span and greater ability to isolate cohort effects, surveys for these seven nations—West 
Germany, Great Britain, the United States, Austria, Hungary, Ireland, and the 
Netherlands—are central to the analysis. Of the other 12 nations with at least two time 
points, six are former communist nations of eastern Europe (East Germany, Czech 
Republic, Slovenia, Poland, Bulgaria, and Russia), and six are Western nations 




All three sets of ISSP surveys ask about agreement with statements concerning gender 
roles and equality. Despite diverse nations in the sample and the diverse domains of 
gender equality covered by the questions, the 12 items appear to reflect an overall 
dimension of support for gender equality and form a reliable scale (Cronbach’s alpha of 
.80). The items in abbreviated form are as follows: (1) A working mother can establish 
just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does not work; 
(2) A preschool child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works; (3) Family life 
suffers when the woman has a full-time job; (4) A job is all right, but what most women 
really want is a home and children; (5) Being a housewife is just as fulfilling as 
working for pay; (6) Having a job is the best way for a woman to be an independent 
person; (7) Both the husband and wife should contribute to the household income; (8) A 
husband’s job is to earn money; a wife’s job is to look after the home and family; (9) A 
 
2 Spain has data for 1994 and 2002, but it lacks measures of education in 1994 and, given the importance of 
this variable, effectively has data for only one year. Demographic Research: Volume 25, Article 21 
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woman should work after marrying and before there are children; (10) A woman should 
work when there is a child under school age; (11) A woman should work after the 
youngest child starts school; and (12) A woman should work after the children leave 
home. With all items coded so that high scores indicate support for gender equality and 
standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one, a standardized 
scale is created from summing the items. 
The lack of nuance in these items means that they miss important components of 
views about gender equality (Brewster and Padavic 2000; Mason and Lu 1988), and the 
items relate to work/family issues for women rather than to politics, earnings, 
discrimination, task sharing at home, or men’s roles. Goldscheider, Oláh, and Puur 
(2010) argue that attitudes about public equality relating to work and politics change at 
different rates than components relating to private or family equality. Also, Kane and 
Kyyrö (2001) make a distinction between attitudes that, on one hand, promote 
ideological refinement but maintain individualism and largely reproduce inequality and 
those that, on the other hand, espouse group-based remedies to fundamentally 
restructure relations of inequality between men and women’s roles. The items studied 
here relate to private more than public gender equality and more to individual than 
group-based remedies for gender inequality. Still, items such as these are commonly 
used in national and cross-national surveys and meaningfully summarize variation in 
attitudes toward certain forms of gender equality across as well as within nations. The 
reliability of the scale used here plus the consistent relationships observed in previous 
studies between gender equality items and socioeconomic characteristics and period 
trends suggest the value of the items.  
Cohort measures single years of birth and ranges from 1900 (or earlier) to 1984 (or 
later). Year has three values: 1988, 1994, and 2002. To avoid exact dependency with 
cohort and year, age is grouped into seven categories: 18–25, 26–35, 36–45, 46–55, 56–
65, 66–75, and 76+. Given the focus on cohort changes and characteristics determined 
early in life and largely stable thereafter, the key determinants are gender, mother’s 
work, and especially, education. For gender, females are coded 1. A mother worked 
measure equals 1 for respondents whose mother ever worked for pay for at least one 
year after the birth of a child and before the child turns 14.   
The education measure is based on years of schooling completed, which is recoded 
to have a minimum of 8 and a maximum of 20. Years completed is more comparable 
across nations than measures based on the highest degree obtained. However, several 
nations ask only about highest degree, and in nations that do ask about years of 
schooling, some respondents report only their highest degree. Given that the two 
measures have a high correlation of .62, the degree measure is used to impute values 
when data for the years completed measure are missing. However, some nations in the 
early years truncate the measure. (For example, in 1988 Great Britain reported a Pampel: Cohort change, diffusion, and support for gender egalitarianism in cross-national perspective 
minimum of 10 and maximum of 14.) To adjust for somewhat different scales, 
education also can be standardized within nations and years. That is, each individual’s 
education is centered on the mean of the nation and year and divided by the standard 
deviation of the nation and year so that all nations and years have the same mean of 0 
and standard deviation of 1. Standardized education can account for differences in 
gender egalitarianism within nations, but not between nations.   
The remaining variables reflect current rather than past characteristics. Although 
less relevant to early cohort experiences, these variables affect gender egalitarianism. A 
set of five dummy variables measures employment status: (1) full-time worker or 
student; (2) part-time worker; (3) unemployed; (4) homemaker; and (5) retired. Dummy 
variables measure marital status by spouse employment status: unmarried and non-
cohabiting persons serve as the omitted group; married or cohabiting persons whose 
spouse is not employed define one dummy variable; and married or cohabiting persons 
whose spouse is employed define a second dummy variable. A measure of family 
income differs in wording across nations, with some nations asking about net income 
and others asking about gross income. With the national currency differing as well, it is 
necessary to create a standardized family income score that has a mean of 0 and 
standard deviation of 1 for each nation and year. This measure can affect differences 
within but not between nations.  Two other measures, occupation and urban residence, 




A cross-classified random-effects model for the analysis of age, period, and cohort 
effects (Yang and Land 2006) is well suited to testing hypotheses about cohort changes 
in the effects of education. The model treats cohort and cohort squared plus control 
variables as determinants of the outcome measures of gender egalitarianism (GE). The 
individual data are nested within cells created by the cross-classification of period and 
age group. The use of cohort quadratic terms with five-year age groups and the two or 
three survey years eliminates the dependency of cohort on age and period. Following 
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2 σ
0 , k v
where i refers to individuals within j age groups and k years, X to m control variables 
(including dummy variables for nation), and e is a normally distributed error with a 
mean of 0 and variance of  . The product terms allow for nonlinear changes in the 
effect of education across cohorts.  With the intercept assumed to vary randomly, the 
Level 2, or between-cell, model takes the following form: 
 
00 0 jk j u β γ =+ +
                                                          
 
 
where γ0 is the model intercept or adjusted mean outcome; u0j is the residual random 
effect of age group j on β0jk averaged over all periods, which is assumed to be normally 
distributed with mean 0 and variance τu; and v0k is the residual random effect of period k 
on β0jk averaged over all ages, which is assumed to be normally distributed with mean 0 
and variance τv. The model thus allows for estimation of cohort effects on GE with 
random-effects controls for age group and year.
3 The slope coefficients β1 through βm 
are treated as fixed. With all variables centered, the crossed random-effects estimates 
come from xtmixed in Stata 11.0.
4 
The three hypotheses translate into predictions about the multilevel coefficients. 
The structural position hypothesis (H1) predicts that because changing population 
composition accounts for increases in GE, cohort will have little influence net of the 
individual determinants (i.e., β1 = β2 = β4 = β5 = 0). The value-change hypothesis (H2) 
predicts that because of the widespread increase in GE among all groups, cohort will 
nonlinearly increase the intercept or level of GE (i.e., β1 > 0 and β2 < 0, but β4 = β5 = 0). 
The diffusion hypothesis (H3) predicts that the slopes of education, not just the GE 
level, will change across cohorts as favorable views first emerge among innovative 
groups with direct interests in equality and then diffuse to other groups. This change in 
relationships across cohorts implies that the key determinants of GE interact with cohort 
and cohort squared (i.e., β4 > 0 and β5 < 0). The interactions, however, should be 




3 Random effects might also be estimated for nations in models with three levels. The number of nations 
available for analysis, however, falls well below that needed to obtain reliable estimates (approximately 30, as 
a rough rule of thumb). I use fixed effects for nations instead. 
4 The xtmixed program does not allow for use of weights, but checks using regression show that weighting 
changes the results only slightly. Pampel: Cohort change, diffusion, and support for gender egalitarianism in cross-national perspective 
   http://www.demographic-research.org  678
7. Results 
7.1 National variation  
Table 1 lists the means by nation and year for the standardized GE scale. The means are 
higher in 2002 than in earlier years, and all nations show increasing GE over time. For 
example, the mean for West Germany rises from –.43 in 1988 to –.15 in 1994 and to .26 
in 2002, while the mean for the United States rises by less, from 0.04 in 1988 to 0.18 in 
1994 and to 0.26 in 2002. For comparisons across nations in 2002, the most recent year, 
East Germany, Norway, and Sweden have the highest mean values, while Australia, 
Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, Russia, and New Zealand have the lowest means values. 
Although there are exceptions, the former-Communist nations of eastern Europe 
generally score lower than the Western nations. 
As shown in Table 1, there are 8 nations in 1988, 19 in 1994, and 18 in 2002; 
pooling these data gives 45 nation-years.  Most of the variance in the GE scale exists 
within rather than between nations and years, however.  Some additional runs allow for 
calculation of intraclass correlations. For the group of seven nations with three time 
points, the between-nation and year variance in the GE scale equals 7.1% of the total; 
for all nations combined, including those with two time points, the between-nation and 




Table 2 shows effects of the determinants of the GE scale with random-effects controls 
for year and the age categories, and with fixed-effects or dummy variable controls for 
nation. Consider first the top panel of results for women. The initial models include 
only the seven nations with three time points. In the first model, GE increases with 
cohort, but the increase tends to level off for the cohorts born most recently. These 
coefficients indicate increasing GE when controlling for compositional changes, and 
thus favor the value-change argument over the structural-position argument. In addition, 
the random effects for year and the age categories show higher GE in later years and for 
middle-age persons. The other variables have expected relationships that match the 
findings of previous literature: Women with working mothers, no marital or cohabiting 
partner (the omitted category), high education, high family income, and full-time work 
(the omitted employment category) have higher GE values. Demographic Research: Volume 25, Article 21 
http://www.demographic-research.org  679
Table 1:  Mean scores on gender egalitarianism scale and sample sizes by 
nation and year 
Nation  1988 1994 2002    Nation  1988 1994 2002 
1. Australia    -0.14  0.03    11. Netherlands  -0.21  0.12  0.29 
    1,778 1,341    1,635 1,905 1,194 
2. West Germany  -0.43  -0.15  0.26    12. Norway    0.18  0.53 
  2,981  2,320     930        2,015  1,462 
3. East Germany    0.90  0.95    13. Sweden    0.52  0.74 
    1,096     427        1,269  1,078 
4. Great Britain  -0.03  0.18  0.20    14. Czech Republic    -0.07  0.14 
  1,307     980  1,953        1,022  1,284 
5. Northern Ireland    0.17  0.19    15. Slovenia    -0.07  0.33 
       647     977        1,029  1,093 
6. US  0.04  0.18  0.26    16. Poland    -0.47  0.05 
  1,396 1,445 1,170       1,592 1,245 
7. Austria  -0.45  -0.06  0.17    17. Bulgaria    -0.25  0.01 
     948     931  1,997        1,109  990 
8. Hungary  -0.40  -0.58  -0.07    18. Russia    -0.64  -0.08 
  1,731 1,500 1,022       1,996 1,795 
9. Italy  -0.22  -0.09      19. New Zealand    -0.05  -0.02 
 1,028  1,018          1,044  1,024 
10.  Ireland  -0.23 0.03 0.22    Total  -0.26  -0.05 0.20 
  1,004     938  1,178      12,030  25,634  22,160 
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Table 2:  Unstandardized coefficients and t values for multilevel models of 
gender egalitarianism with year and age group random effects 
  7 Nations, Three Years  19 Nations, Two or Three Years 
  b t    b t    b t    b t   
Females
a                    
Cohort .284  10.04 *** -.205 -2.02 *  .269 11.67 *** -.013  -0.16     
Cohort
2 -.020  -6.42 *** .034 3.11 **  -.019 -8.04 *** .009  1.13     
Mother Worked
b .186  11.13 *** .185 11.07 *** .193 15.88 *** .192  15.83  *** 
Education (years)  .050  14.29 *** -.037 -1.86   .054 22.86 *** -.004  -0.25   
Family Income
c .050  5.22 *** .050 5.17 *** .058 8.51 *** .058  8.48  *** 
Part-Time Worker
d -.210  -7.52 *** -.209 -7.49 *** -.188 -9.88 *** -.187  -9.85  *** 
Unemployed
d -.219  -4.56 *** -.218 -4.55 *** -.143 -5.06 *** -.142  -5.02  *** 
Homemaker
d -.570  -25.37 *** -.569 -25.36 *** -.537 -31.28 *** -.536  -31.20  *** 
Retired
d -.314  -11.05 *** -.309 -10.87 *** -.215 -11.06 *** -.212  -10.85  *** 
Marr. Sp. Not Emp.
e -.056  -2.23 *  -.052 -2.08 *  -.060 -3.54 *** -.059  -3.48  *** 
Marr. Sp. Emp.
e -.180  -8.51 *** -.181 -8.55 *** -.151 -10.42 *** -.151  -10.42  *** 
Education x Cohort         .044 4.97 ***       .026  3.78 *** 
Education x Cohort
2         -.005 -5.09 ***       -.003  -3.67 *** 
Age Group Variance  0.038      0.037     0.034     0.036     
Year Variance  0.090      0.093     0.122     0.122     
Individual N  12,662     12,662   25,446   25,446    
 Males
a                    
Cohort .327  8.75 *** .134 1.22   .264 9.44 *** .014  0.17     
Cohort 
2 -.022  -5.65 *** -.006 -0.47   -.016 -5.66 *** .004  0.50     
Mother Worked
b .226  12.04 *** .226 12.02 *** .247 18.07 *** .246  17.97  *** 
Education (years)  .045  13.26 *** .000 -0.01   .045 18.98 *** -.017  -1.04   
Family Income
c   .034  3.39 *** .035 3.47 *** .042 5.86 *** .043  5.89 *** 
Part-Time Worker
d .087  1.70   .088 1.72  .041 1.22  .042  1.25     
Unemployed
d .035  0.86   .040 0.97   .065 2.27 *  .069  2.43  * 
Homemaker
d .048  1.05   .045 0.99   -.002 -0.05   -.006  -0.15     
Retired
d .088  2.66 **  .089 2.66 **  .084 3.69 *** .083  3.63  *** 
Marr. Sp. Not Emp.
e -.302  -12.88 *** -.300 -12.81 *** -.254 -14.88 *** -.252  -14.76  *** 
Marr. Sp. Emp.
e .137  5.50 *** .138 5.53 *** .124 7.17 *** .124  7.19  *** 
Education x Cohort         .017 1.90         .023  3.23 ** 
Education x Cohort
2         -.001 -1.52         -.002  -2.56 * 
Age Group Variance  0.067      0.067     0.042     0.043     
Year Variance  0.115      0.115     0.138     0.138     
Individual N 10,311      11,027     20,657     20,657     
 
a Dummy variable controls for nation not listed. 
b Mother did not work omitted. 
c Standardized within country. 
d Full-time work omitted. 
e Unmarried omitted. 
* p < .05  ** p < .01  *** p < .001 Demographic Research: Volume 25, Article 21 
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More important for testing the diffusion hypothesis, the second model includes the 
interaction of education with cohort and cohort squared (again for the same seven 
nations). Differences in the effects of education, as represented by the interaction terms, 
fit the curvilinear pattern predicted by the diffusion hypothesis. The significant positive 
cohort interaction term and the significant negative cohort squared interaction term 
indicate that the effects of education initially increase across cohorts but eventually 
peak and decline. Calculations from the interaction coefficients indicate that the peak 
education effect occurs for the 1944 cohort.   
The next two models in Table 2 use the sample of 19 nations with at least two time 
points. The additive determinants in the third model for the larger sample of nations are 
similar to those for the smaller sample. In the last model, the education by cohort 
interactions are again significant and in the predicted direction, although they are 
somewhat smaller than in the model for the smaller sample of nations. The education by 
cohort coefficients of 0.026 (t = 3.78) and –.003 (t = –3.67) are about half the size of 
the coefficients of 0.044 (t = 4.97) and –0.005 (t = –5.09) for the smaller group of 
nations. Both groups of nations show effects of education that rise and reverse, but the 
effects are weaker for the larger sample.  
The bottom panels of Table 2 present the same models for males. The coefficients 
for males differ from those for females in several ways. For men, having a working 
spouse increases gender egalitarianism, while having a non-working spouse lowers 
egalitarianism. Also, own employment status has only weak influences for men. Of key 
importance, the education by cohort interactions have the predicted signs for men, but 
the interactions are smaller than for women in the more homogenous set of seven 
nations and fail to reach statistical significance. Calculations from the coefficients 
indicate that, whereas the reversal occurs for female cohorts born in 1944, it occurs for 
male cohorts born in 1985. In these nations, new gender views appear to have spread 
among men later than among women. In contrast, the interaction coefficients for the 
larger group of nations differ little between men and women.   
To present the interaction effects visually, Figure 1 graphs the female and male 
slopes of education for each cohort as implied by the interaction models and does so 
separately for the two sets of nations. The four curves depict  rising slopes for education 
that reverse, but the curve for females in the smaller sample has the highest peak and 
largest drop, and indicates both the greatest divisions and most convergence. For the 
youngest cohorts, the effects of education for women in the smaller, three-year sample 
of nations drops closest to zero.   
 Pampel: Cohort change, diffusion, and support for gender egalitarianism in cross-national perspective 
Figure 1:  Predicted education slope for males and females by cohort and 
nation group 
 
The models for the larger sample of nations, although supporting the diffusion 
hypothesis, mix Western nations and eastern European nations with diverse economic, 
social, and political backgrounds. Table 3 controls somewhat for this diversity by 
estimating models separately for Western nations and eastern European nations. The 
regions differ in a variety of dimensions—national income, communist history, gender 
discrimination, cultural history—that cannot be separated with the small number of 
nations. Still, differences in the models across these two regions help to identify where 
diffusion of GE has occurred most clearly.  
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Table 3:  Unstandardized coefficients and t values for multilevel models of 
gender egalitarianism with year and age group random effects,  
by region 











a  b t    b t    b t    b t   
Cohort  0.008  0.08   0.269  1.98  *  0.033 0.33   0.000  0.00     
Cohort
2  0.014  1.37   -0.024  -1.72   0.008 0.72   0.000  -0.02     
Mother Worked
b 0.207  14.47 *** 0.172  7.71  *** 0.249 15.65 *** 0.233  8.86  *** 
Education (years)  0.010  0.54   0.103  3.51  *** -0.011 -0.57   0.025  0.80     
Family Income
c   0.065  7.91 *** 0.027  2.28  *  0.053 6.08 *** 0.024  1.87     
Part-Time Worker
d  -0.232  -10.92 *** -0.161  -3.62 *** 0.075 1.95   -0.031  -0.45     
Unemployed
d -0.260  -6.60 *** 0.010  0.26    0.054 1.47   0.098  2.19  * 
Homemaker
d  -0.628  -31.58 *** -0.314  -8.66 *** -0.034 -0.71   -0.097  -1.29     
Retired
d  -0.292  -11.84 *** -0.148  -4.57 *** 0.104 3.76 *** 0.013  0.34     
Marr. Sp. Not Emp.
e -0.049  -2.23 *  -0.035  -1.34   -0.320 -15.76 *** -0.094  -3.07 ** 
Marr. Sp. Emp.
e -0.160  -8.98 *** -0.073  -3.02 **  0.165 8.01 *** 0.096  3.14  ** 
Education x Cohort   0.025  3.08 **  -0.021  -1.69   0.024 2.95 **  -0.001  -0.09     
Education x Cohort
2  -0.003  -3.45 *** 0.002  1.66    -0.002 -2.59 **  0.001  0.39     
Age Group Variance  0.037      0.045      0.017     0.000     
Year  Variance 0.100     0.222     0.090    0.207    
Individual N  17,751     8,859     15,164    6,555    
 
a Dummy variable controls for nation not listed. 
b Mother did not work omitted. 
c Standardized within country. 
d Full-time work omitted. 
e Unmarried omitted. 
* p < .05  ** p < .01  *** p < .001 
 
As shown in Table 3, the two regions differ in the pattern of the education by 
cohort interactions. The models for the Western nations are similar to the models over 
all in Table 2. In contrast, the interaction terms for eastern European nations in Table 3 
fail to reach statistical significance. Figure 2 graphs the education by cohort slopes 
predicted by the models for males and females in both regions. The reversal in 
education effects shows clearly for the Western nations. Likely reflecting randomness, 
the curves for eastern European nations fail to show the rise and decline in the effects of 
education that the Western nations do. These results suggest little evidence of GE 
diffusion across levels of education in eastern Europe.   
 Pampel: Cohort change, diffusion, and support for gender egalitarianism in cross-national perspective 
Figure 2:  Predicted education slope for males and females by  




7.3 Sensitivity Checks 
Checks of the sensitivity of the results to influential nations strengthen the findings for 
women but suggest less reliability in the results for men. The models in Table 4 focus 
on the education by cohort interactions for the smaller groups of nations with data on 
three time points. The largely Western nations in this group are those where diffusion 
has occurred most clearly. For all seven of these nations, the female education by cohort 
coefficient of 0.044 (t = 4.97) and education by cohort squared coefficient of –0.005  
(t = –5.09) match those presented earlier. Based on jackknife procedures in which 
models are estimated with one of the nations deleted, the table lists seven more sets of 
interaction coefficients, first for females and then for males. For females, deleting West 
Germany and Hungary reduces the coefficients, while deleting Great Britain and the 
United States increases the coefficients. Yet, the interaction coefficients remain 
significant and similar to those for the full set of nations.  The checks demonstrate the 
robustness of the interactions.   
 
 
   http://www.demographic-research.org  684Demographic Research: Volume 25, Article 21 
http://www.demographic-research.org  685
Table 4:  Unstandardized coefficients and t values for multilevel coefficients 
and t values for interaction terms in jackknifed models of gender 
egalitarianism 
  Education x Cohort    Education x Cohort
2 
  b t     b t   
Females             
All Nations  0.044 4.97  ***   -0.005  -5.09  *** 
Delete West Germany  0.030 3.25  **   -0.003  -3.57  *** 
Delete Great Britain  0.049 5.30  ***   -0.005  -5.36  *** 
Delete US  0.061 5.92  ***   -0.006  -5.72  *** 
Delete Austria  0.046 5.00  ***   -0.005  -5.02 *** 
Delete Hungary  0.032 3.23  **   -0.004  -3.77  *** 
Delete Ireland  0.037 3.89  ***   -0.004  -3.86  *** 
Delete Netherlands  0.047 5.00  ***   -0.005  -5.08  *** 
            
Males            
All Nations  0.017 1.90      -0.001  -1.52        
Delete West Germany  0.006 0.64      -0.000  -0.40      
Delete Great Britain  0.015  1.57        -0.001  -1.01        
Delete US  0.027 2.62  **    -0.002 -2.19  * 
Delete Austria  0.023 2.34  *   -0.002  -2.09  * 
Delete Hungary  0.014  1.35           -0.001  -1.29          
Delete Ireland  0.023 2.29  *      -0.002  -1.78        
Delete Netherlands  0.009  0.92         -0.001 -0.60   
 
* p < .05  ** p < .01  *** p < .001 
 
For men, the coefficients in Table 4 show that individual nations affect the results 
in non-trivial ways. Among all seven nations, the coefficients of 0.017 (t = 1.90) for 
education by cohort and –0.001 (t = -1.52) for education by cohort squared show effects 
that are smaller than for women and provide limited support of the diffusion hypothesis.  
However, deleting the United States or Austria raises both interaction coefficients to 
statistical significance. This suggests that the diffusion pattern of change in the effects 
of education may hold across most of the nations but is weakened by the special 
experiences in one or two nations. The limited diffusion of GE among males in the 
United States and Austria does not appear typical of the other nations. Thus, these 
checks demonstrate less reliability of results for males. To a large extent, the pattern of 
diffusion is weaker and less consistent for males than for females. 
Checks on alternative measures of education (not presented in the tables) similarly 
reveal greater robustness for the female than for the male results. Other measures 
include 1) educational degree rather than years of education completed, 2) educational Pampel: Cohort change, diffusion, and support for gender egalitarianism in cross-national perspective 
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degree standardized within nations, and 3) years of education completed standardized 
within nations. For women, the educational degree and standardized measures continue 
to show significant cohort interactions, at least among Western nations. For men, the 
other measures tend to produce weaker results. For example, within-nation 
standardization of the measure of education years reduces the interactions to below 
significance for the sample of nations with three time points.  This again suggests less 




Based on the analysis of a diverse set of European nations plus the United States, 
Australia, and New Zealand, the adoption of gender egalitarian views occurred steadily 
across cohorts over much of the twentieth century. Less obviously, however, the results 
also show that adoption reflects nonlinear changes in the influence of education and the 
strength of socioeconomic cleavages. The effects of education become stronger across 
older cohorts as attitudes toward gender equality shift from largely unfavorable to 
favorable among women with greater education (and likely stronger commitment to 
work and career). Among the most recent cohorts, however, the effects of education 
become weaker as favorable attitudes spread widely through the population and 
socioeconomic differences decline in importance. These results replicate the results 
reported by Pampel (2011) and Fischer and Hout (2006) for the United States, but with 
a wider set of nations.  
Theories of both structural position and value change, though incomplete on their 
own, play a role in explaining the pattern of results.  Structural changes that increase 
education and related work and career opportunities for women provide the impetus to 
adopt egalitarianism by strengthening direct interests in equality among certain 
segments of the population. Value changes among other groups of women with less 
education (but still with interests in gender equality) occur later through processes of 
diffusion. According to the diffusion theory, both structural and cultural mechanisms 
contributed to the rising support for gender equality over the last century but did so in 
sequence.   
The evidence is strong and robust for women in Western nations but is less 
supportive for men and for eastern European nations. Men not only hold less egalitarian 
views than women but also show less responsiveness to social change. In Western 
nations, the effects of education on gender egalitarianism increase and decrease for men 
as they do for women but appear highly influenced by a few nations and by the 
particular measure of education. Gender egalitarianism among recent cohorts thus 
depends more on level of education among men than among women. This difference in Demographic Research: Volume 25, Article 21 
http://www.demographic-research.org  687
patterns of change suggests that diffusion has moved faster and farther among women 
than among men and qualifies theoretical claims about diffusion. The diffusion process 
best fits women more than men likely because of their stronger interests in and benefits 
from equality. Since the advantages of an innovation increase the speed at which it is 
adopted (Rogers 2003), the gains to women relative to men lead to quicker diffusion of 
gender egalitarianism among women relative to men.  
Neither men nor women show a clear diffusion pattern in eastern European 
nations. Numerous structural, political, cultural, and historical characteristics may 
contribute for the differences in patterns and trends in gender egalitarianism. More 
complete attention to the special circumstances and forces affecting gender equality in 
the former-Communist nations of Eastern Europe is needed to explore the sources of 
the differences. The theories evaluated here focus on structural change in education and 
work opportunities for women and on values related to economic security in affluent 
nations.  However, consideration of other factors not highlighted by these theories are 
needed to better understand the experiences of the Eastern European nations. This study 
describes the scope of the diffusion findings but is limited in its ability to explain the 
cross-national differences. 
The empirical approach used here to specify and test hypotheses about the sources 
of change in gender egalitarianism has several advantages. Examining differences 
across cohorts rather than years, modeling the varying effects of education on gender 
egalitarianism rather than just the level of gender egalitarianism, and testing nonlinear 
predictions of an integrative diffusion theory all help extend the literature in new 
directions. Making comparisons across cohorts builds on other studies (Brewster and 
Padovic 2000; Brooks and Bolzendahl 2004; Ciabattari 2001; Schnittker, Freese, and 
Powell 2003; Wilkie 1993) but also more fully exploits the potential for change to 
occur across groups that are born and socialized in different historical periods. 
Modeling interactions between cohort and education captures both the diffusion of 
gender egalitarianism and the importance of cohort sources of social change.     
The data and methods used to evaluate the approach, however, present some 
limitations. First, the data allow for only the indirect study of diffusion. The patterns of 
change in the education effects are consistent with initial adoption of gender 
egalitarianism by innovative groups and the later diffusion to other groups. Indeed, the 
predictions of nonlinear interactions of cohort and education are highly falsifiable. Yet, 
other types of data and forms of analysis are needed to more directly validate claims 
about diffusion. For example, better measures of the historical characteristics of cohorts 
over the past century can extend the approach. Gathering cohort-based measures of the 
economic, political, social, and cultural environment—particularly as they relate to 
education, work, and earnings opportunities of women—from historical sources 
presents a daunting task. Even so, future research can use such data to provide Pampel: Cohort change, diffusion, and support for gender egalitarianism in cross-national perspective 
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additional tests of predictions that the context of gender equality relates nonlinearly to 
the effects of the determinants of gender egalitarianism. 
Second, the inability to measure SES and family characteristics of older cohorts at 
the time of young adulthood rather than at older ages compromises the tests. Current 
education, the key determinant in the analysis, reflects past education better than current 
employment, job characteristics, income, and family status reflect past characteristics. 
Measures of other socioeconomic characteristics would improve the models, but the 
lack of long-term longitudinal data for multiple cohorts during the formative years of 
youth and young adulthood warrants the reliance on education.    
Third, the gender egalitarian items used here are only a subset of possible 
measures, and one cannot assume that they give the same results as other sets of 
measures would. The items on work/family issues faced by women give little attention 
to changes in men’s roles and the need for restructuring gender roles. Studies need to do 
more to organize the diverse measures used in the literature into multiple dimensions of 
gender egalitarianism and compare results across the different dimensions.   
Some of these limitations can be overcome with the release of the 2012 ISSP data, 
which offers a fourth module on family, work, and gender roles. The new 2012 surveys 
will extend the period of study for nations that participated in previous surveys and 
likely add some new nations to the sample. Going beyond the basic results reported 
here, the new surveys will allow for better measures of diffusion and a more detailed 
comparison of the nations of Western and Eastern Europe.  
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